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Fatalities from illegal immigration from Africa to Europe are a grave reality. The
phenomenon represents a major challenge for both home and host countries.
Nonetheless, almost nothing is known about how themotivations of potentially illegally
migrating individuals are formed. This paper aims to explain the factors behind the
formation of the willingness to migrate illegally knowing that death might occur during
the trip. I focus on the role of expectations, friends and relatives who have migrated and
host countries policies. By using an original survey among Senegalese residing in Dakar
in 2006-2007, I show that potential illegal migrants are willing to accept a substantial
risk of death. I find that high expectations and migrant networks are positively related
with illegal migration motivations. Surprisingly, I find that stricter immigration policies
deter potential legal migrants much more than potential illegal migrants.
Finally, I find that the price of illegal migration is negatively correlated with the
willingness to migrate illegally.
JEL Code: F22, O15
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1 Introduction
Illegal or undocumented migration from the developing world to rich countries raises
many important issues at the political, economic and humanitarian level. Not only did the
global economic crisis exacerbate migration, but globalization, widening economic gaps
among the rich and poor countries and geopolitical shifts also trigger additional illegal
migration. Furthermore, restrictions to legal migration imposed by receiving countries
may increase the probability to take the illegal route.
Since the fall of 2005, people in Europe have regularly witnessed tragic events related
to illegal migration from Africa, such as the Ceuta and Melilla tragedy1, as well as media
images of people disembarking onto European coasts. Such events show how strongly
migrants are motivated to leave their country at any cost with the hope of finding a bet-
ter life. However, while massive waves of illegal migrants from Africa arrive in Europe
on a regular basis and many more die on their way, illegal migration has mostly been
studied in the context of Mexico and the United States (Gathmann 2008; Hanson 2006;
Orrenius 2004; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005; Ryo 2013). Only few studies have examined
illegal migration from Africa to Europe. For instance, Chiuri et al. (2007) document the
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characteristics of illegal migrants by using a sample of individuals coming among oth-
ers from African countries and entering Italy illegally during 2003. In the specific case of
Senegal, Mbow and Tamba (2007) also provide a profile of the illegal migration candi-
dates. Baizán et al. (2013) find in the context of the MAFE project2 that the legal status
is an important factor of Senegalese migration. Fall (2007) claims that illegal migration
from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and more specifically to the Canary Islands is proba-
bly linked to the enforcement of the border controls in the Spanish enclaves and transition
countries.
In this paper, I aim to contribute to the scarce literature on African migration in general
and the legal status of African migrants in particular. I examine the factors related to
and mechanisms behind illegal migration from sub-Saharan Africa. From an empirical
perspective, this is an important contribution and has the potential to participate in policy
debates in light of the ongoing media coverage of African migrants arriving in Europe via
boat. Therefore, I answer the question, “why people are willing to jeopardize their lives
to go abroad and live in an underground economy?” More precisely, I compare potential
legal and illegal migrants and focus on the role that expectations, migrant networks and
migration policies have on the probability to take an illegal journey. Although these three
determinants are well known as important drivers of migration, I argue that they are key
factors of the willingness to migrate illegally. They can make the difference between the
decision to migrate legally and the decision to migrate irrespective of the risks, including
using an illegal method.
I use a tailor-made survey which I conducted in Dakar between November 2006 and
April 2007. During extended personal and face-to-face interviews, I collected informa-
tion about the characteristics and motivations of potential migrants. The survey also
elicits information on individuals’ potential destinations and perceived financial cost of
migration.
Whether or not potential migrants realize their migration goals, they provide a good
indication of real guiding motivations. In the case of illegal migration, it is important to
gain some evidence using subjective data. The willingness to migrate, and particularly
to do so without proper authorization from the host country, is a good indicator of how
frustrated people are with the living conditions in their country of origin. Illegal migrants
who manage to arrive in the host country are not easily observable in the new country.
Subjective pre-migration data are thusmore valuable because they help elicit motivations,
perceptions and expectations. They also allow a better understanding of illegal migration
before migrants arrive in the host country and their motivations are contaminated by a
new reality. Such a study can offer valuable insights to the home and host countries when
they formulate and adapt pragmatic migration policies.
Through the descriptive data, I find that potential illegal migrants are willing to accept
a substantial risk of death. This also suggests a large utility gap between migrating and
remaining in Senegal and underscores the emergency these people feel to migrate in order
to improve their well-being. Second, my findings show that biased and erroneous expec-
tations of potential migrants play an important role in the willingness to migrate illegally,
highlighting the fact that people may base a risky decision on incorrect information.
Third, there is a positive relationship between migrant networks and illegal migration
motivations. This may be due to the fact that friends and relatives (FARs) who have
alreadymigrated help reduce the costs associated with illegal migration. At the same time,
Mbaye IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:21 Page 3 of 19
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/21
FARs can sometimes provide less than accurate information about their living conditions
abroad, thus increasing the desire of potential migrants to undertake the move. Fourth,
host countries’ stricter immigration policies might not be effective and may backfire.
While they may deter potential legal migrants from migrating, they may not halt illegal
migration. Finally, as the prices of illegal migration increase, the likelihood of migrating
illegally decreases. This suggests that the very poor are unable to pay to migrate illegally.
However, it does not mean that the poor will not consider the illegal journey.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the
background about illegal migration in Senegal. Section 3 reviews the existing literature
on the triggering factors of illegal migration such as expectations, networks and strict
immigration policies. Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics obtained from
the survey. Themodel specification and results are presented in Section 5 before Section 6
concludes.
2 Background on illegal migration from Senegal
While the phenomenon of migrants landing in a host country without proper authoriza-
tion is not new, new methods of illegal migration that push the envelope of safety are
continually being developed as a means of side-stepping restrictive immigration policies.
Prior to 1999, illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa used to go to the Maghreb via
the desert to eventually reach Europe. After 2000, the intensification of the border con-
trols at the Straits of Gibraltar have increasingly driven illegal migrants to use boats to
reach European coasts such as Lampedusa, Sicily or the Canary Islands (Adepoju 2008;
De Haas 2006). Many of these people are originally from Senegal, a country affected with
the departure of many migrants illegally. The motto of thousands of Senegalese who try
to migrate illegally is “Barsa wala Barsakh”, which in Wolof3 means “Barcelona4 or Die”:
in other words, if people cannot migrate to Europe or to a rich country, they would rather
die than stay in Senegal. To understand the scope of this phenomenon, half of the 30,000
illegal migrants who arrived in the Canary Islands in 2006 were Senegalese, while 1,000
out 7,000 African illegal migrants who died during the crossings in the same year were
Senegalese (Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía 2007). The determination
of migrants and the magnitude that illegal migration took in Senegal is probably related
to the economic conditions and huge differences between Senegal and the host countries.
For instance, according to the Human Development Index, Senegal is ranked 166 out of
182 countries, while Spain is ranked fifteenth and France is placed eighth (United Nations
Development Programme 2009). The comparison in terms of GDP per capita (Constant
2005 US$) shows that the GDP per capita is evaluated at 790 US$ for Senegal, 25,486 US$
for Spain and 33,493 US$ for France (World Bank 2009).
An illegal migration trip is well organized and involves different people with specific
roles, such as the promoter who puts in place the project and is in charge of the logistics;
the coordinator who is the main intermediary between the promoter and candidates; the
secondary intermediaries who advertise the project and recruit people. The captain of the
pirogue is often an experienced fisherman and is helped by some of his colleagues for the
management of the GPS, for instance. Last but not least, parents can sometimes take an
active part by helping their children find fundings for the trip (Mbow and Tamba 2007).
The pirogue in which migrants take place costs about 8,000,000 Fcfa (12,180 Euros) and
the total costs of the trip are evaluated around 15,000,000 Fcfa (22,833 Euros). Mbow
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and Tamba (2007) also inform us that the typical illegal migration candidate is a young
man between 20 and 29 years old, single, belonging to the Mouride brotherhood5 and the
Wolof ethnic group.
3 Conceptual framework: the role of expectations, migrant networks and
migration policies in illegal migration
Very few studies have offered theoretical evidence surrounding the willingness to migrate
illegally. An interesting contribution is by Stark and Fan (2011) who show that there can
be an equilibrium in which an individual will be voluntarily migrating illegally and take
up degrading work in the host country such as prostitution rather than not migrating and
having a decent job such as farming in the home country if there is a large number of
people from the same origin place who believe that the others do the same. Ryo (2013)
emhasizes how norms and values are important in the illegal migration decision from
Mexico to the US. Arcand and Mbaye (2013) study both theoretically and empirically the
determinants of illegal migration from Senegal. However, they focus on the role of risk
and time preferences in the willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler. This
paper focuses on the role of potential migrant expectations, networks and immigration
policies considered in illegal migration.
3.1 Expectations
I argue that high expectations about living abroad increase the willingess to migrate ille-
gally and risk one’s life. Expectations of potential migrants are often based on the percep-
tions they have about the earnings of their FARs living abroad. It is shown within existing
literature that the probability to migrate can be motivated by great expectations concern-
ing the living standards at the destination (Dalen et al. 2005a). These high expectations
are often unrealistic and can lead to a negative migration experience (Sabates-Wheeler
et al. 2009). Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the literature about the role of expec-
tations regarding migration. Some studies argue that the role of over-expectations on
migration decisions needs to be put into perspective. For instance, McKenzie et al. (2012)
find that contrary to the general understanding that over-expectations increase the pres-
sure to migrate, potential male migrants from Tonga to New Zealand underestimate both
their likelihood of finding a job and their earnings. It is very likely in the specific Sene-
galese context of this study that there are some over-expectations of returns to migration
from potential migrants. This hypothesis can be explained by sociological and economic
factors. Many households in Africa, and more specifically in Senegal, with good living
conditions have one or many family members who have migrated. Suchmigrants invest in
buildings, business and social services for the community (Beauchemin and Schoumaker
2009; Melly 2011), as well as they send remittances. These transfers and investments
bestow them with an important economic power and signal, at the same time, a much
better life abroad. This in turn affects the intentions and expectations of individuals who
have non-migrant families in the local communities (Dalen et al. 2005b).
However, these studies do not necessarily explain the differential effect that expecta-
tions might have on legal and illegal migration. In this paper, I compare these two types
of migration and argue that in the case of illegal migration, these over-expectations are
exacerbated relative to legal migration. For people left behind, the apparent success of
migrants and utility they bring to their family and community at home is all due to
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migration. This creates and reinforces feelings of relative deprivation among other com-
munity members. The high social pressure, in turn, ignites as well as it perpetuates the
aspiration to migrate, even illegally.
3.2 Migrant networks
Studies on illegal migration from Mexico to the U.S. show that having relatives who
have tried illegal migration matters (Ryo 2013). Networks assist individuals in finding a
job more easily, learning information about how to cross borders illegally and meeting
the financial cost of migration through informal credit mechanisms between individu-
als (Dolfin and Genicot 2010; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005;
Singer and Massey 1998). In the context of this study, I go a step further in the anal-
ysis of the role of networks. Related to the hypothesis about the role of expectations
on the willingness to migrate illegally, I claim that the information about expected for-
eign wages of potential migrants often comes from the perceptions of relatives’ earnings.
FAR’s positively influence the willingness to migrate illegally through various chan-
nels. They can help reduce migration costs; they can also provide a certain standard
of living to their family left behind. FARs can supply them with information about
life abroad that may or may not be true and can lead them to believe that success is
guaranteed with migration, especially if these FARs stand to benefit from the illegal
migration of the individual. All these arguments are in favor of the assumption that
FARs may have a positive relationship with the willingness to migrate illegally. Subse-
quently, I assume that migrant networks, and particularly family and friends of those
who have already migrated legally or illegally, can be considered another trigger of illegal
migration.
3.3 Migration policies
Restrictive immigration policies mean that the conditions to enter host countries are
made substantially difficult. This can relate to quotas of immigrants, their level of edu-
cation and skills or stricter border controls of the host countries. By default, migration
inflows should decrease under such regimes. However, empirical evidence on the role
of migration policies is rather mixed in the literature. Restrictive immigration policies
could decrease the willingness to migrate illegally, but they could also increase it. On
the one hand, tight border enforcement increases the likelihood of being apprehended,
which raises illegal migration prices, which in turn reduces the demand for smugglers’
services (Gathmann 2008; Singer andMassey 1998). On the other hand, stricter immigra-
tion policies often have some pernicious effects on illegal migration. Orrenius (2004) and
Gathmann (2008) show that border enforcement actually worsens the situation because
smugglers take advantage of this to raise their prices. Consequently, these authors claim
that only a small deterring effect is achieved by the enforcement of border controls
between Mexico and the U.S. Ryo (2013) finds that the perception of being apprehended
or the severity of the law are not related to the intention to migrate illegally. In fact,
tougher border enforcement may push people to use more routes and die, as it often
happens along the US-Mexico border. Therefore, the positive or negative relationship
between restrictive immigration policies and illegal migration is a priori unclear. It is thus
interesting to provide some new empirical evidence about this relationship, particularly
in the context of sub-Saharan Africa.
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4 Data
4.1 Design of the Survey
Given the scarcity of data about African illegal migrants, a survey that can capture the
characteristics and propensity of individuals to exit even illegally is certainly warranted.
Therefore, I conducted a survey in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, in order to exam-
ine the factors triggering illegal migration. Ethical approval for this study was granted
by Université Gaston Berger of Saint Louis (Sénégal) and CERDI (Centre d’Etudes et
de Recherches sur le Développement International, Université d’Auvergne, Clermont-
Ferrand, France); informed consent was gained from all study participants. The original
data set produced from this survey can help fill the gap in the literature and provide a
unique opportunity to further understand this phenomenon.
The survey has four sections. The first section contains information about the socio-
demographic and economic characteristics of the individuals. The willingness of individ-
uals to migrate legally or illegally, including the motivations involved, are in the second
section. Detailed information about the preferred destinations of potential migrants
makes up the third section. The last section comprises the willingness of the individuals
to risk their lives or take financial risks, for example, by paying a smuggler6.
I interviewed 400 individuals with a small team between November 2006 and April
2007. Prior to the main survey, we conducted a pilot study to test the feasibility of the
study. Moreover, given that questions were asked with closed answers, the pilot also
allowed adjusting the proposed answers.
To achieve our goal of explaining illegal migration motivations, we identified five major
neighborhoods in Dakar in which people may have a high propensity to migrate. The first
neighborhood was the University Campus and its surrounds, reflecting an area mostly
inhabited by middle class families. The second neighborhood was Fass, Medina and
Geule-Tapee; and the third was Guediawaye. The second and the third regions are mainly
popular neighborhoods, in which various people from different walks of life reside. The
fourth neighborhood was Sandaga which is one of the main areas for shopping in the
city center. I select this region because many people coming from the rural areas work
there. For some of them, Dakar is the final destination, but for many, the city is a tempo-
rary place while they are preparing their further migration by working in low-paying jobs.
Finally, the fifth region was the main departure beaches for illegal migrants namely Kayar,
Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yoff.
We administered the questionnaire to randompeoplemet on the street and explained to
them the goal of the study. With illegal migration being such a sensitive issue, we assured
the repondents that their anonymity would be preserved. After we obtained a climate of
confidence, we conducted the interviews in Wolof, which is spoken by the majority of
Senegalese. On a few occasions we administrated the questionnaire in French.
To measure people’s willingness to migrate, we directly asked them: “Are you willing to
migrate?”. Available answers were “Yes” or “No”7. Out of the 400 individuals, 367 individ-
uals, representing 92% of the sample, responded positively to this question (Table 1). 33
individuals (8% of the sample) responded no to the same question. In the follow-up, we
continued the questionnaire with only people who said yes, and we further asked them:
“If you are not able to migrate legally, are you willing to migrate illegally?”8 Out of the 367
individuals who wish to migrate, 222 report that they would only be willing to migrate
legally, while 145 report that they would be willing to attempt illegal migration (Table 1).





Are you willing to migrate? 367 0.92 0.28
If you are not able to migrate legally, are you willing to migrate illegally? 145 0.40 0.50
Note: The second question was asked only if repondents are willing to migrate illegally.
Before presenting the summary statistics, I would like to discuss the sampling and
potential issues related to it. First, the survey only includes the capital city Dakar and
not all of the Senegalese population. The choice of Dakar, however, is justified because
of its accessibility and the variety of its population. I did not include rich regions in
Dakar because it is very unlikely that people living in these neighborhoods would consider
migration, and especially illegal migration. People in rich neighborhoods are highly edu-
cated in most cases, are much wealthier than the average population and have good living
conditions in Senegal. Moreover, when they want to go abroad, they are able to provide
reliable documents to consular officials and obtain legal visas. Second, the proportion
of people who consider migration is high (92%) and warrants further discussion. While
there was some variation across regions, the proportion of people who wish to migrate
was high in all areas. In general, the willigness to migrate in Senegal is high and supported
by other surveys. For instance, the Gallup polls suggest that 55% of Senegalese are will-
ing to migrate (Gallup 2008). Although this figure from Gallup polls is much lower than
the share of people willing to migrate in my survey, it is still much higher than in other
countries. This can be explained by the sampling design, with the figure 92% reaching
my goal of targeting the population with a high propensity to migrate. Furthermore this
does not necessarily mean that all of these people will attempt migration, although some
of them will do so. This high number is a very strong indication of the degree of frustra-
tion concerning the economic conditions these individuals face in Senegal and underlines
the importance of push factors. It is worth noting that while expectations and other pull-
factors may be over or underestimated, push factors are known. When it comes to risking
one’s life, push factors are extremely important.
I acknowledge that because the data are not nationally representative, my results cannot
be generalized and applied to the entire population. I am also aware of the bias that my
results may suffer due to the non randomness of the sample.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 2 presents the summary statistics, also disaggregated by legal status. Men represent
88% of the sample, this proportion is the same for both potential legal and illegal migrants.
This is consistent with human capital theory that men are more likely to migrate.
The average age of potential illegal migrants is slightly lower (24 years) than that of
potential legal migrants (27 years). The proportion of married people among potential
legal migrants is almost double (32%) that among potential illegal migrants (17%). The
proportions of dependent people are higher for potential legal migrants than for poten-
tial illegal migrants. The average education level in the sample is secondary, with 27%
of people having reached this level. It is interesting to note that 55% of potential ille-
gal migrants have a low level of education, whereas they represent 33% of potential legal
migrants. Only 5% of potential illegal migrants have a university level, which is five times
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Table 2 Summary statistics
Variables Legal migration Illegal migration Total
(N=222) (N=145) (N=367)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Characteristics
Male 0.88 0.33 0.88 0.32 0.88 0.33
Age 26.95 08.01 24.45 5.36 25.96 7.18
Married 0.32 0.47 0.17 0.37 0.26 0.44
Child is male 0.88 0.33 0.78 0.42 0.84 0.37
Child is female 0.89 0.31 0.78 0.42 0.85 0.36
Adult is male 0.79 0.41 0.70 0.46 0.75 0.43
Adult is female 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37
Education level
Low education level 0.33 0.47 0.55 0.50 0.42 0.49
Secondary level 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44
University level 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.22 0.16 0.37
Koranic school 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Home owner 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.56 0.50
Mouride 0.39 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.50
Ethnic dummies
Wolof 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47
Lebou 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
Hal Pular 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.32
Serere 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
Diola 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23
Manjack 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10
Bambara, Mandingue, Sub-region 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
Region dummies
Campus 0.17 0.38 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.32
Fass, Medina and Geule tapée 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.31
Guédiawaye 0.34 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.36 0.48
Sandaga 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.33
Kayar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yoff 0.27 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46
Expenditure in Senegal 77,684.68 66,006.94 73,604.35 62,840.70 76,054.93 64,698.93
Expenditure in Senegal per capita 20,678.40 15,647.79 22,690.14 18,800.45 21,481.92 16,979.35
Motivations
Expected foreign wage 1,850,505 7,008,376 1,141,931 1,158,843 1,567,466 5,486,186
Expected foreign wage per capita 1,089,245 6,829,681 600,252.9 1,021,903 893,918 5,332,343
Restrictive immigration policies 0.62 0.49 0.79 0.41 0.68 0.47
Having relatives abroad 0.66 0.48 0.88 0.33 0.74 0.44
Destination and Prices
Spain preferred 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.44
Italy preferred 0.15 0.36 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39
US preferred 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43
France preferred 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.31
United Kingdom preferred 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22
Canada preferred 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.17
Anywhere preferred 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.31
Visa price 829,785.10 485,625.33
Pirogue price 419,089.91 43,049.96
Embassy price 3,071 603 935,445.5
Migration prices 2,220,254 1,756,592
Note: Amounts are presented in Fcfa and 1 Euro = 655.957 Fcfa.
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less than in the population of potential legal migrants. People living in a house that they
or their family own represent 56% of the sample, which does not greatly vary according
to the legal or illegal consideration of migration. Interestingly, a larger percentage among
the potential illegal migrants belong to the Mouride brotherhood9 (54%) than among the
potential legal migrants (39%).
Used as a proxy of monthly income, average monthly expenditure is estimated at 73,604
Fcfa (112 Euros) for potential illegal migrants, which is slightly lower than for potential
legal migrants (77,685 Fcfa or 118 Euros)10. I measure income expectations from a direct
question: “How much are you expecting to earn each month in the destination coun-
try?” As Table 2 shows, expected monthly wages are higher for potential legal migrants
(1,850,505 Fcfa or 2,821 Euros) than potential illegal migrants (1,141,931 Fcfa, i.e. 1,739
Euros). Potential illegal migrants have more relatives who have migrated (88%) on average
than potential legal migrants (66%). 79% of potential illegal migrants report that they will
not give up on migration if there is a tightening of immigration policies in the destination
countries, whereas this percentage is lower among potential legal migrants (62%). During
the survey, I observed that there are three ways to migrate. I noted that three different
prices could exist for one destination, which in fact corresponds with the various ways
of migrating. Thus, I classified each price according to the way of migration. The first is
called the “visa method”, which involves migrating legally by applying directly for a legal
visa and paying the airfare. The second method is the “pirogue method”, which involves
paying a fee to a smuggler and using boats or routes towards Maghreb countries in order
to penetrate into various destination countries illegally, often including Spain, Italy or
France. Finally, the third method is the “embassy method”, which essentially means brib-
ing someone who is linked to consular sections in Dakar to obtain legitimate documents.
I consider the “pirogue” and “embassy” methods as illegal. For a given destination country,
I also gained the responses concerning the prices of different migration methods. Table 2
presents the average price of all destinations together for each method of migration. Due
to the nature of the type of journey offered by the “pirogue method”, its probability of
success is much lower than with the embassy method. Therefore, the price of this method
is lower (419,090 Fcfa or 638 Euros), on average, for all destinations than the embassy
method (3,071,603 Fcfa, i.e. 4,678 Euros). The latter has the same probability of success as
the legal method. According to the answers of those interviewed, the visa method price
is, on average, 829,785 Fcfa (1,264 Euros).
Table 3 presents the average prices for each method of migration and each destination
country computed from the responses of potential migrants. To check the reliability of
the answers of potential migrants, I compare the prices obtained from their declaration
with those reported by press reports, discussions with some migrants, and people who
have made some attempts. All match with the existing prices in the migration market
except for the “visa method”. In Table 3, the “visa method 1” corresponds to the response
of potential migrants, while the “visa method 2” corresponds to the prices I approximated
from the average cost of the airfare according to the destination country, in addition to
the visa fees. The difference between “visa method 1” and “visa method 2” shows that
potential migrants generally have good information on the current illegal migration prices
but not on the legal migration prices. For most individuals, the likelihood of migrating
legally is low, which implies that they can be misinformed about the legal market and do
not necessarily know the price that corresponds to a legal migration11.
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Table 3 Averagemigration prices according to destination countries
Visa method 1 Visa method 2 Pirogue method Embassy method
Spain 1,100,000 450,552 391,981 2,153,846
US 910,000 828,567 430,000 4,041,667
Italy 250,000 537,875 390,476 2,346,154
France 237,500 495,855 Unknown 2,952,381
United Kingdom Unknown 543,390 Unknown 3,700,000
Canada 200,000 873,377 600,000 1,850,000
Other 1,750,000 462,500 4,585,715
Notes: Prices are expressed in Fcfa. 1 Euro=655.957 Fcfa. This table presents the average prices for each destination and
each method of migration generated from the respondents answers (except for the “visa method 2”). The Visa method 1
price is unknown for the United Kingdom, and the Pirogue method price is unknown for both France and the United
Kingdom because no respondent was able to give these prices.
Interestingly, the vast majority of the sample of potential illegal migrants (77%) reported
that they are willing to risk their life in order to emigrate. Accordingly, Figure 1 shows the
distribution of their probabilities of death. When we asked how likely they were to die
if they tried to migrate illegally to their preferred destination, potential illegal migrants
reported that they are willing to accept a 25% risk of death at the median. Put differently,
it means that half of potential illegal migrants think there is a risk of death lower or equal
to 25%; while another half think there is a risk of death higher or equal to 25%, which is
substantial. This illustrates the strong attitudes illegal migrants have towards risk. It also
shows that respondents are aware of the gravity of undertaking a trip as illegal migrants
and illustrates the large gap in utility from remaining in Senegal and migrating, even at












0 20 40 60 80 100
Probabilities of death
Figure 1 Probabilities of death reported by individuals willing to risk their life in order to migrate.




My main interest is to explore the relationship between expectations, migrant networks
and migration policies and the likelihood of undertaking illegal migration. In order
to empirically examine this, I estimate various simple probit models. The estimation
function is specified as follows:
mi =
{
1 if xiβ + ziθ + αr + i > 0
0 if xiβ + ziθ + αr + i ≤ 0 (1)
Where mi is the binary dependent variable, which equals one if individual i is will-
ing to migrate illegally and 0 if he is willing to migrate only legally; xi is the vector of
interest variables that I use to investigate the hypotheses discussed in the conceptual
framework. These variables are related to the expectations of migrants, migrant networks
(proxied by the existing relatives of migrants abroad) and immigration policies. β is the
vector of parameters to be estimated. Equation (1) also includes zi, the vector of con-
trol variables. The latter are composed of the prices of migration, socio-demographic and
economic characteristics such as the logarithm of the monthly expenditure proxy of the
average monthly wage of the individuals divided by the number of dependents12, gen-
der, age, marital status, education level, gender of dependent children (dummy equals
one if the individual has male or female dependent child), gender of dependent adults
(dummy equals one if the individual has a male or female dependent adult), home
occupation status (dummy variable for the individual and family who own the house
where they are living) and indicator variables for religion and ethnic groups. Mouride
is the religious dummy equal to one if the individual belongs to the Mouride’s brother-
hood. The other brotherhoods are Tidiane, Layenne, Niass ène, (which are all Muslims),
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim who does not belong to any particular group, Animist or
without religion. Ethnic groups are Wolof, Lebou, Hal Pular, Serere, Diola, Manjack,
Other (Bambara, Mandingue or come from the sub-region: Guinea, Mauritania, Côte
d’Ivoire). θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated for these variables. I include in
equation (1) five regional dummies (αr) in order to control for the unobserved regional
characteristics. These dummies represent the five neighborhoods in the sample. Addi-




Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4 present the role of expectations, measured by the logarithm
of the expected monthly foreign wage, on the likelihood of migrating illegally. A higher
expected wage in the destination country is positively correlated with the consideration
of illegal migration, thus supporting the hypothesis that high expectations lead to an
increased probability to migrate illegally. I argue that these expectations are generated
from the perceptions of the earnings of relatives who have migrated.
Figures 2 and 3 compare the distributions of expected monthly foreign wages and
the perceptions of FARs’ wages for the potential legal migrants and potential illegal
migrants, respectively, with similar distributions in the two cases. On average, poten-
tial legal migrants expect to earn more than their relatives who have previously migrated
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Table 4 Results on the willingness tomigrate illegally: the role of expectations, relatives
andmigration policies
Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log expected wage 0.075** 0.078**
(2.31) (2.25)
Having relatives abroad 0.144* 0.155*
(1.86) (1.94)
Restrictive immigration policies 0.206*** 0.200***
(3.33) (3.21)
Log migration prices -0.340*** -0.314*** -0.333*** -0.345***
(8.62) (8.73) (8.96) (8.76)
Log expenditure per capita -0.013 0.023 0.033 -0.036
(0.26) (0.53) (0.69) (0.70)
Education level
Secondary level -0.069 -0.071 -0.062 -0.066
(0.91) (0.95) (0.82) (0.86)
University level -0.338*** -0.312*** -0.345*** -0.352***
(5.09) (4.42) (4.76) (5.66)
Koranic school -0.024 -0.053 -0.034 -0.018
(0.26) (0.62) (0.39) (0.20)
Male 0.059 0.066 0.100 0.015
(0.58) (0.64) (1.06) (0.14)
Age 0.034 0.018 0.014 0.038
(1.03) (0.57) (0.46) (1.17)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(1.47) (1.11) (1.01) (1.60)
Married -0.171** -0.184** -0.156** -0.143*
(2.28) (2.53) (2.02) (1.88)
Child is male -0.129 -0.109 -0.139 -0.127
(1.39) (1.22) (1.48) (1.37)
Child is female -0.083 -0.047 -0.054 -0.048
(0.81) (0.48) (0.53) (0.47)
Adult is male 0.002 -0.008 0.005 0.029
(0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.39)
Ault is female 0.078 0.074 0.079 0.046
(0.95) (0.90) (0.97) (0.53)
Home owner -0.053 -0.056 -0.030 -0.061
(0.78) (0.82) (0.44) (0.88)
Mouride 0.157** 0.124* 0.138* 0.139*
(2.21) (1.76) (1.96) (1.91)
Observations 339 343 343 339
The dependent variable equals one if the individual is willing to migrate illegally and zero if he is willing to migrate only
legally. The reference category of the variable education level is low education level. Robust z-statistics in parenthesis:
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. All estimations include ethnic and region dummies.
(Figure 2). When I compare the expected foreign wages of potential illegal migrants and
their perceptions of FARs’ wages (Figure 3), it appears that the expectations of potential
illegal migrants are very close to their perceptions, even if they are lower. The average
expected monthly wage of illegal migrants is equal to 1,141,931 Fcfa (1,740 Euros) and
the median expected monthly wage is 800,000 Fcfa (1,218 Euros). The important point
here is to discuss why these amounts are high. I take the example of Spain, which is
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Perceptions of family and friends relatives' wages (log) Expected wages (log)
Figure 2 Income expectations and perceptions of potential legal migrants.
the preferred destination of potential illegal migrants in the sample. In 2007, the annual
average income in Spain of an immigrant coming from outside the European Union was
estimated at 9,319 Euros (777 Euros per month) per consumption unit and 5,792 Euros
(483 Euros per month) per person (Instituto Nacional de Estadística of Spain 2007)13. I
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Figure 3 Income expectations and perceptions of potential illegal migrants.
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living standards in Europe for Senegalese. According to the French National Institute
of Statistics (Institut National de la Statisque et des Etudes Economiques 2006)14, the
median living standards in France in 2006 were estimated at 1,470 Euros per month. The
net median salary for a full-time job for immigrants from sub-Saharan African countries
in France was estimated at 1,400 Euros in 2010, as opposed to 1,550 Euros for the group
of non-immigrants (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques 2010).
Because these amounts are related to immigrants with legal status, it is relevant to assume
that illegal migrants earn less than the amounts expected above.
5.2.2 Networks and information
Many respondents already have relatives in their preferred destination country and have
an idea about the wages they earn. The variable relatives is a dummy equal to one if the
individual has members of his family, close friends or relatives who have migrated. Rela-
tives, andmore widelymigrant networks, increase a person’s likelihood tomigrate illegally
(Table 4, Columns 2 and 4). This confirms the hypothesis that these networks are a source
of information, whether true or not, that can trigger the desire to migrate illegally.
5.2.3 Migration policies
The variable restrictive immigration policies is a dummy equal to one if the potential
migrant does not give up on migration if the immigration policies in the host countries
become tight. Contrary to what one might expect, this variable has a significant and
positive sign (Table 4, Columns 3 and 4). This means that tighter immigration policies
enforced by the host countries have a positive effect on the propensity to migrate illegally.
These policies deter those who are willing to migrate legally more than potential illegal
migrants. This result suggests that restrictive immigration policies may be less effective in
staving off illegal migration and can incite potential migrants to turn to illegal methods,
such as paying a smuggler or corrupting officials to obtain legal documents.
5.2.4 Other results
The estimates in Table 4 also present some interesting results about some control vari-
ables. The variable “married” is significantly different from zero and negative in all
specifications. Therefore, being married reduces the probability of migrating illegally
compared with a non-married individual. The main reason is that married people have
more familial responsibilities and ties at home and thus are less willing to take risks. The
consequences of attempted illegal migration will not only affect them directly but will also
have an impact on their spouses.
The coefficient on the dummy “Mouride” is positive and significant. Belonging to this
brotherhood increases the propensity to migrate illegally relative to the other religious
categories. There are two main explanations for this effect. First, historically and cultur-
ally, “Mouride” people identify with being great travelers. Moreover, work ethic is very
high in their vision. According to their ideology, it is important to find a job wherever it
is possible. Second, and probably more importantly, relatives are essential in Senegalese
migrants’ socialization (Fall 1998), with “Mouride” people constituting an important reli-
gious group with a large network abroad. This is therefore another illustration of the
network effect on illegal migration.
Results concerning the level of education show that individuals with a university educa-
tion have a lower willingness to migrate illegally, suggesting a negative selection in terms
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of education. Educated people have more opportunities to find a good job, to get out of
poverty and above all to obtain legitimate documents and migrate legally.
Finally, the variable migration prices represents the entirety for all the destinations and
without any distinction concerning the method of migration. In all columns of Table 4,
this variable has a strong negative effect on the willingness to migrate illegally. I pro-
vide a more detailed analysis about the relationship between the migration prices and the
willingness to migrate illegally in Table 5.
Table 5 Results on the willingness tomigrate illegally: the role of themigration costs
Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log pirogue price (illegal) -1.059** -0.595
(2.53) (1.55)
Log embassy price (illegal) -0.345*** -0.299**
(3.41) (2.33)
Log visa price (legal) 0.036 0.038
(0.89) (0.68)
Log migration prices -0.321***
(8.83)
Wage per capita 0.024 0.013 0.030 0.029 0.038
(0.56) (0.31) (0.72) 0.65 (0.84)
Education level
Secondary level -0.095 -0.101 -0.131** -0.083 -0.067
(1.23) (1.53) (1.99) (1.08) (0.89)
University level -0.314*** -0.327*** -0.346*** -0.310*** -0.322***
(3.57) (4.99) (5.26) (3.46) (4.48)
Koranic school -0.144* -0.093 -0.121 -0.130 -0.047
(1.70) (1.19) (1.54) (1.50) (0.53)
Male 0.125 0.121 0.144* 0.115 0.102
(1.21) (1.40) (1.75) (1.08) (1.06)
Age 0.032 0.043 0.039 0.044 0.015
(0.95) (1.35) (1.22) (1.26) (0.47)
Age square -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(1.33) (1.62) (1.51) (1.59) (1.01)
Married -0.262*** -0.245*** -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.185**
(3.47) (3.81) (3.91) (3.40) (2.49)
Child is male -0.201** -0.101 -0.148 -0.189* -0.125
(1.96) (1.15) (1.57) (1.90) (1.36)
Child is female -0.087 -0.118 -0.090 -0.085 -0.068
(0.77) (1.17) (0.84) (0.77) (0.67)
Adult is male -0.157* -0.057 -0.093 -0.147 -0.015
(1.74) (0.76) (1.19) (1.61) (0.19)
Ault is female 0.128 0.115 0.112 0.131 0.092
(1.30) (1.42) (1.32) (1.34) (1.16)
Home owner -0.093 -0.063 -0.095 -0.083 -0.040
(1.34) (1.04) (1.49) (1.19) (0.59)
Mouride 0.059 0.129** 0.103 0.063 0.138**
(0.83) (2.08) (1.62) (0.88) (1.98)
Observations 290 343 327 290 343
Notes: The dependent variable equals one if the individual is willing to migrate illegally and zero if he is willing to migrate
only legally. The reference category of the variable education level is low education level. Robust z-statistics in parenthesis:
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. All estimations include ethnic and region dummies.
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Table 5 presents the estimates of the average price according to the destination country
of visa method 115, the pirogue method, the embassy method and all the prices without
any distinction concerning the method of migration. To my knowledge, there is no pre-
vious empirical evidence in the African case about the effect of illegal and legal prices
on the willingness to migrate illegally. The price of illegal migration methods, namely the
pirogue method (Column 1) and embassy method (Column 2), are significant and nega-
tive. The variable log visa price (Column 3) is positive yet not significantly different from
zero. For people who are willing tomigrate illegally, the level of the price that they perceive
they should pay will not influence their decision. It is very likely that these individuals
know their low probability of obtaining legitimate documents due to their socio-economic
characteristics and realize that their only option is illegal migration. Subsequently, a
high or a low legal price would not reflect a key element in their willingness to migrate
illegally.
However, when I put the respective prices together (Column 4), the variable log pirogue
price remains negative yet not significant. One can assume that the price levels of one
illegal method will influence the price of the other within the illegal migration mar-
ket. The negative relationship between the price of illegal migration and the willingness
to migrate illegally can be explained by the fact that migration, and illegal migration
in particular, are expensive for people from the working class or even from the middle
class. The price of the embassy method is highly expensive and very discouraging for the
poorest illegal migration candidates. The result of migration prices without any distinc-
tion concerning the method of migration obtained in Table 4 is confirmed in Column 5
of Table 516.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms behind
illegal migration from sub-Saharan Africa. It investigates how people’s motivations are
formed regarding the decision to migrate illegally by using an original survey among
potential migrants in Senegal. I show how the expected foreign wage, the potential
migrant networks and restrictive immigration policies affect illegal migration probabil-
ities. I later empirically estimate the effect of illegal and legal migration prices on the
willingness to migrate illegally.
Results show that potential illegal migrants are willing to accept a substantial risk of
death, which suggests a large utility gap between migrating and remaining in Senegal.
Biased expectations towards the popular destination countries increase the likelihood of
migrating illegally; consequently, people may base a risky decision on incorrect informa-
tion. There is a positive relationship between migrant networks and the willingness to
migrate illegally, which may be due to the fact that relatives who have already migrated
provide a true or false picture of their living conditions, possibly increasing the desire
of potential illegal migrants. I also find that contrary to the initial objectives, restrictive
immigration policies for entering host countries deter potential legal migrants more than
their illegal counterparts. Finally, I show that the price of illegal migration is negatively
correlated with the willingness to illegally migrate, suggesting that the poorest are unable
to migrate illegally.
Collecting data about illegal migration is not an easy task and some caution is war-
ranted in the interpretation of the results. However, this study provides a good starting
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point for future research avenues into understanding the motivations of illegal migra-
tion from Africa, which is widely reported by the media yet relatively unexplored in
terms of academic research. As I report in this paper, illegal migration starts first with
the belief that success is only possible abroad. Consequently, immigration policies should
be more focused on the formation of motivations, which reflect the first step of an
illegal migration project. In the Senegalese case, a radical change may be necessary in
the way of thinking and viewing migration as the only measure of, and possibility of,
success.
Endnotes
1Ceuta and Melilla are two Spanish enclaves in Morocco. In 2001, the Spanish
government constructed fences to stop illegal migrants from crossing these borders.
During the fall of 2005, many illegal migrants mainly coming from sub-Saharan Africa
and attempting to reach Spain were killed or injured by border controllers.
2The MAFE (Migration between Africa and Europe) project is a research initiative
particularly interested in the migration issues between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.
3While French is the official language in Senegal, Wolof is one the main languages
spoken.
4Barcelona represents the European Eldorado here.
5Senegal is composed of 94%Muslims, 5% Christians and 1% Animists. Many Muslims
are affiliated with different brotherhoods headed by a spiritual leader. Mouride is one of
the most important Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal.
6See Additional file 1 for the details of the questionnaire.
7Although the “I do not know” or “I am not sure” options were not available in the
questionnaire, none of the respondents raised this issue.
8The question is in this form because I assume that if people have the opportunity to
migrate legally, they will naturally go towards this type of migration. In the Senegalese
context, it is very likely that people attempting illegal migration know that obtaining
legitimate documents would be difficult for them. This can be due to characteristics
such as their low level of qualifications, or the instability or weakness of their
professional situation. Attempting legal migration would be a waste of time and
therefore they may restrict themselves from asking for legal documents.
9The variable Mouride is a dummy equal to 1 if people belong to this religious
brotherhood.
10Expenditures are considered more reliable and less biased than the level of the actual
labor income because people answer more easily about this variable.
11For the pirogue method for the U.S., I only saw one press report that detailed a case
of people on boats trying to reach this country. For the case of Canada, only two
respondents gave prices for this destination and this kind of migration.
12In the estimates, we use the average monthly expenditure and the foreign expected
wage per capita, which means that we divided these variables by 1+ the number of
dependents in order to consider the familial responsibilities of the individuals that may
play a role on the way of migrating.
13INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística of Spain.
14INSEE: Institut National de la Statisque et des Etudes Economiques.
15I use the average price of each destination of the visa method 1 in the estimates,
rather than the visa method 2, because it is this price that individuals will consider in
their decision.
16The variation of the number of observations in Table 5 is due first to the missing
values in the monthly expenditure and second to the fact that the price of the visa
method 1 and the pirogue method are unknown for United Kingdom and France, which
explains the missing data for these variables.
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